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1 GENERAL BACKGROUND: COUNTRY PROFILE
Canada is a federal state in which, as a general matter, labour relations come
under provincial or territorial jurisdiction with a residual federal jurisdiction
covering labour relations in federally regulated areas, including the federal
public service, inter-provincial transportation and communications, and the
postal service. Although it is estimated federal labour law covers about 10% of
the Canadian workforce, because its jurisdiction extends to matters of national
importance the federal government plays a disproportionately large role in
regulating essential service strikes. Because there are ten provinces and three
territories in Canada, each with their own labour relations laws, it is impossible
to provide a comprehensive account of Canadian essential service strikes
regulation. Therefore, the focus of this report is on federal and Ontario laws,
with occasional forays into other jurisdictions where warranted.
Canada is best described as a liberal market economy with some social
democratic tendencies. Historically, it has generally preferred to give capitalist
enterprises a large measure of market freedom, but it has, to different degrees at
different times and places, established public enterprises and created regulatory
structures that limit market freedom in the name of securing the public welfare.
In part, this can be explained by the fact that it is a large territory with a relatively
small population, but more importantly since the turn of the twentieth century
there have been various populist and labourist political formations that pressed
for such arrangements. The New Democratic Party, founded in 1961, is the
current heir to this tradition and it has formed the government at one time or
another in seven provinces and one territory, although it has never formed the
federal government. Its influence has fluctuated; at the end of 2017 it formed two
provincial governments and was the official opposition in two others. Two other
parties have dominated Canadian politics: the Liberals (centre-left) and Conser-
vatives (centre-right).
In broad political terms, it is important to recognize that, like most
advanced capitalist countries, since the 1970s its policy orientation shifted away
from the Keynesian welfare state model that dominated in the decades after
World War II toward neoliberalism.1 The neoliberal turn has had a significant
impact on the legal regulation of essential services, which this chapter explores
in detail.
Canada is a parliamentary democracy based on the English model it
inherited. Its legal system is rooted in the common law, with the exception of
Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction. Prior to 1982, the principle of
1. Harvey, 2005; Cahill/Konings, 2017.
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parliamentary sovereignty within jurisdictional boundaries was near absolute.
This changed dramatically in 1982 with the adoption of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.2 Charter rights now limit executive and legislative powers and, in the
last fifteen years, the Charter has become an important source of labour rights
with significant consequences for the regulation of essential service strikes.
The legal status of trade unions was ambiguous in Canada prior to 1872
when the government enacted the Trade Union Act.3 As a result, workers
became formally free to join a union, bargain collectively and, under certain
conditions, collectively withdraw their labour, without fear of prosecution. But
none of these freedoms was legally protected by rights. Employers could fire
workers for joining unions or acting collectively.
It was not until the Second World War and its immediate aftermath that
Canadian jurisdictions adopted the Wagner Act model (WAM) of labour rela-
tions, which provided a legally protected right to organize and engage in lawful
trade union activities, including striking, in exchange for severe limitations on
legal freedoms, most importantly the freedom to strike.4 Statutory collective
bargaining schemes, however, did not extend tomost public sector workers until
the late 1960s. The public sector collective bargaining laws of the 1960s often
departed from the private sector model in significant ways, including the
freedom to strike which was more tightly controlled, in part because of concerns
about the disruption of essential services. Again, these limits will be explored in
more detail.
Under the WAM, private sector union density increased, peaking at around
30% in the late-1950s to early 1960s. So too did collective bargaining coverage.5
Since that time density has steadily declined and is now estimated to be about
16%. Public sector union density grew rapidly in the late 1960s, reaching around
70%, where it has hovered ever since.
Since enterprise bargaining is built into the DNA of the WAM, there is little
incentive for employers’ associations to form for the purposes of collective
bargaining. While there are exceptions, such as large-scale construction where
sectoral bargaining is the norm, employer associations do not play a direct role
in Canadian collective bargaining, although they actively seek to advance
employer interests, including by intervening in legal cases where permitted.
Strike activity in Canada, like in most of the advanced capitalist countries,
has declined precipitously in recent decades.6 Figure 17 illustrates the downward
trend for both private and public sector strikes in Canada from 1979 to 2007. In
the past decade the number of person days lost to strikes in the private and
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
3. Tucker, 1991.
4. Fudge/Tucker, 2001 and 2010, 15.
5. The discrepancy arises because bargaining unit members are not always required to be
union members.
6. Tucker, 2014.
7. Ibid.
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public sectors has fluctuated widely but the overall downward trend has not
changed.8
Figure 5.1 Public and Private Sector Strike Rates per 1000 Workers, 1979 to
2007
2 COLLECTIVE LABOUR RELATIONS
As mentioned above, the Canadian collective bargaining regime is based on the
WAM, but before clarifying its principal features regarding organizing, bargain-
ing, and striking, it is important to highlight the distinction between freedoms
and rights already averted to. Using the Hohfeldian conceptual framework, we
think of freedoms and rights as jural relations between people.9 You are free to
do something when no one else can call upon the state to stop you. This is
different from a legal right, which entails a legal duty on others not to interfere
with your action. The distinction is crucial in labour law.
Beginning with organizing, as noted above, Canadians were legally free to
organize unions from at least the late-nineteenth century, but it was only in the
late-1930s that organizing became a legally protected right. Labour statutes
prohibited employers from interfering with or threatening union organizing
activity, although the law preserved their freedom to express their opposition to
8. Government of Canada, 2018.
9. Hohfeld, 1919.
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unions. This produced a grey zone about the boundary between fair and unfair
employer labour practices.10
The law also formally decriminalized collective bargaining in the late-
nineteenth century but collective agreements were not legally enforceable since
the common law viewed them as contracts in restraint of trade. Moreover,
employees had no protected right to bargain collectively until post-war labour
legislation imposed a duty on employers to bargain in good faith with certified
trade unions that demonstrated majority support within a bargaining unit. As
well, those laws made agreements enforceable through grievance arbitration.
The issue of strikes is a bit more complex. Workers also were generally free
to strike but, under common law, the withdrawal of labour was a breach of
contract that allowed the employer to summarily dismiss the striking workers.
Statutory collective bargaining laws gave workers a legal right to strike in that it
protected their employment status while on strike and provided a legal right to
return to their jobs after the strike ended. However, these laws also placed
severe restrictions on the freedom to strike, discussed below.
As already mentioned, public sector workers were frequently subject to a
different legal regime regarding strikes. Some statutes denied public sector
workers any freedom to strike, while others permitted limited strikes but
required the maintenance of essential services. Often interest arbitration was a
substitute to resolve bargaining disputes. We will return to these issues, infra.
Prior to the Charter, labour rights and freedoms were rooted in common
law and statute. This has now changed. The Charter explicitly protects freedom
of association, but the scope of that protection is undefined and requires judicial
interpretation. From the outset courts accepted that freedom of association
protected the freedom to organize, but that freedom was not under threat in
Canada since it was rarely restricted by government. The more important issue
for workers excluded from statutory collective bargaining schemes was whether
the Charter required the government to protect the right to organize. The general
answer was no, except in limited cases where it could be demonstrated that
workers are incapable of exercising their freedom without rights protection.11
The question of whether the Charter protects the freedom or right to
bargain and strike is much more important in the context of essential services
where governments frequently restrict these freedoms. The Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) initially rejected the proposition that freedom of association
protected either, but in 2007 the court unexpectedly reversed itself. It held that
freedom of association protected the freedom to bargain collectively and that it
entailed a duty to bargain in good faith. This made collective bargaining both a
10. Slinn, 2008, 53.
11. Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 (2001).
Chapter 5: Canada
111
constitutionally protected freedom and right.12 Eight years later, the SCC also
held that freedom of association protects the freedom to strike.13
There are, however, two important caveats. The first is that the Charter
only applies to government action. This is less of an issue in the essential
services context where government is normally the actor, either as legislator or
as employer. The second caveat is that the Charter permits violations of
protected rights where the restriction can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. This is very significant since the SCC stated that interference
with associational rights may be permitted in situations involving essential
services.14 This issue will be examined in more detail, infra.
Until recently, international labour rights played an insignificant role in
Canadian labour law. There were several reasons for this. One is that since
Canada is a dualist country, international treaty obligations entered into by the
federal government does not become domestic law unless implemented by
domestic legislation, and provincial legislatures are under no constitutional
obligation to pass implementing legislation.15
A second reason is Canadian governments’ limited embrace of Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) norms. This was evidenced by the fact that
prior to 14 June 2017, Canada had only ratified one of the two foundational
conventions supporting freedom of association (Convention 87, but not Conven-
tion 98). Of course, the lack of ratifications did not immunize Canada from
complaints that it violated freedom of association, since the ILO considers that
all members are bound to respect freedom of association regardless of whether
they have ratified its underlying conventions. In fact, Canadian unions fre-
quently complained to the ILO and its supervisory bodies often upheld those
complaints and made recommendations to the offending government. However,
those recommendations had no legal force and no political impact either. As a
result, governments felt free to ignore the ILO and the violations continued.16
In recent years, however, international law has come to play a much more
significant role through its influence on the development of constitutional law.
The turning point came when the SCC determined that the meaning of freedom
of association under the Charter should be as generous as it is in international
law and thought. The SCC translated the soft law of the ILO and various UN
declarations into hard constitutional law in Canada and, as we shall see, that has
had a significant influence on the development of constitutional labour rights in
Canada.17
12. Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007
SCC 27 (2007).
13. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 (2015).
14. Health Services, para. 108.
15. Macklem, 2012.
16. Adams, 2006
17. Health Services; Bogg/Ewing, 2012, 379; Langille, 2007, 363.
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3 THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
As mentioned, the WAM imposes significant restrictions on the freedom to
strike. In particular, recognition strikes and strikes during the life of a collective
agreement are prohibited. There are also procedural requirements that must be
satisfied for a strike or lockout to be legal. These vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but typically include the following. First, the union must have won
a strike vote among the members of the bargaining unit. Second, the union and
the employer must have bargained to impasse and undergone mediation or
conciliation without success. Third, they must wait a prescribed number of days
after mediation/conciliation has failed before taking industrial action. Fourth,
some jurisdictions, including the federal jurisdiction but not Ontario, require the
union provide the employer with advance notice of the strike.18
In general, the law only permits economic strikes to support collective
bargaining demands. Sympathy or political strikes are almost always unlawful
since unions can only legally strike during the narrow window of opportunity
that opens when no collective agreement is in force and the procedural hurdles
have been cleared. Political and sympathy strikes are not exempt from these
general rules and so are illegal if they are untimely. Canadian unions have so
deeply absorbed these norms that no case has ever posed the question of
whether a union in a legal strike position could engage in a sympathy or a
political strike.
The definition of a strike is quite broad and in addition to a complete work
stoppage includes any concerted action undertaken with a common understand-
ing designed to restrict or limit output. Thus, a partial work stoppage, a
slowdown, or a work-to-rule campaign are all considered strikes.19
It is important to emphasize that while the general restrictions described
here apply to both private and public sector workers, public sectors workers and
particularly essential service workers are subject to additional restrictions,
described infra.
4 THE EXPERIENCE WITH STRIKES IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES
There are no recent studies of the prevalence of strikes in essential services, if
only because in Canada essential services strikes are heavily regulated and,
18. Fudge/Tucker, 2001 and 2010; Slinn/Tucker, 2016, 171; Adams, 1993, 11.7 et seq.
19. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, s 1(1) ‘strike’ includes a cessation of work, a
refusal to work or to continue to work by employees in combination or in concert or in
accordance with a common understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted activity on
the part of employees designed to restrict or limit output; Canada Labour Code, RSC, 1985,
c L-2, s 3(1) ‘strike’ includes a cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to work
by employees, in combination, in concert or in accordance with a common understanding,
and a slowdown of work or other concerted activity on the part of employees in relation
to their work that is designed to restrict or limit output; Adams, 1993, 11.1(i).
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because of that fact, likely infrequent. This was not always the case. As statutory
collective bargaining laws were extended to public sector workers in the 1960s,
much attention was paid to the issue of essential service strikes. For example, in
1968 Professor Harry Arthurs conducted a major study of strikes in essential
services and reported that from 1946 to 1966 strikes in essential industries had
become more frequent and that person days lost in total and per strike were
increasing. 20
If we consider the Canadian experience with essential service strike
regulation from a qualitative perspective, it has revolved around two fundamen-
tal questions: what are essential services and how should essential service
disputes be resolved? We address the former question here and the latter in
Section 5 of this chapter.
Historically, the concept of essentiality in Canada has been a political one.
What activities are so important to the public welfare such that stoppages pose
unacceptable risk and hardship to the broader public? The answer to that
question has changed over time and place. For example, one of Canada’s earliest
collective bargaining laws, the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907
(IDIA) required the parties to undergo a process of conciliation prior to a labour
stoppage in mining, transportation, communications and public utilities. These
services were understood at the time to be so essential as to warrant restrictions
on actions that the parties were otherwise free to undertake.21 During war time
the IDIA was extended to war production industries, expanding the scope of
essential services. The post-World War II collective bargaining statutes retained
compulsory conciliation as a general requirement, not because governments
considered the economy as a whole an essential service, but rather because
compulsory conciliation had come to be seen as a good industrial relations
strategy for avoiding unnecessary conflict. However, these laws only applied to
the private sector and so there was not a great need to be concerned over the
definition essential services.
The exception was with respect to municipal police and fire-fighters.
Although these workers were generally excluded from the normative private
sector schemes, they were soon given access to collective bargaining through
sector specific statutes.22 While some statutes permitted police strikes, in
practice ad hoc legislation usually prevented police from exercising this free-
dom.23 However, most statutory schemes applicable to police and fire-fighters
expressly prohibited strikes and substituted binding interest arbitration by
20. Arthurs, 1971, 1 et seqq.
21. Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 6-7 Edward VII, ch. 20 (1907); Fudge/Tucker, 2001
and 2010, 52 et seqq.
22. For example, see the Fire Departments Act, SO 1947, c 37; the Police Amendment Act, SO
1947, c 77.
23. In October 1969 Montreal police and fire-fighters went on a legal strike. During the sixteen
hours that the strikes were permitted bank robberies increased and a riot occurred during
which one police officer was fatally wounded. The army was called out and back to work
legislation was quickly passed. Online at http://archives.cbc.ca/on_this_day/10/07/.
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neutral third parties. This interference with free collective bargaining was
justified because of the overriding public safety interest in maintaining these
services and that judgment has never been seriously challenged.24
Outside of police and fire-fighters, the issue of determining which services
were essential only became pressing when government extended collective
bargaining to the public and para-public sectors more broadly, beginning in the
mid to late 1960s. One contemporary commentator, Paul Phillips, described the
scope of essential services to be ‘whatever the responsible public authority
believes it to be at any point in time.’ Reflecting the ambiguities of the time,
Harry Arthurs described essentiality as lying ‘mid-way along the progression
from very limited cases where a labour dispute actually does create (or threatens
to create) a danger, to that very broad class of cases where the dispute touches
the public interest in a very incidental way.’25
We will look more closely infra at the ways in which Canadian govern-
ments have defined essential services in the context of the strike regulation laws
of Ontario and the federal jurisdiction. However, the freedom of governments to
define essential services (and to regulate essential service strikes) is now limited
by the SCC’s interpretation of the Charter’s protection of freedom of association.
Here we deal only with constitutional limits on the government’s freedom to
define essential services.
The basic question asked by the court in the Saskatchewan Federation of
Labour (SFL) case is ‘whether the legislative interference with the right to strike
in a particular case amounts to a substantial interference with collective
bargaining.’26 If a law substantially interferes, then the burden shifts to the
government to demonstrate that the restriction is demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. Here is where the scope of essentiality comes into play.
The first step in a section 1 defence under the Charter is to establish that the law
aims to achieve a pressing and substantial objective. In the SFL case, the court
accepted that maintaining essential services is such an objective, but before the
argument can succeed, the court has to be convinced that the services the
government is protecting are sufficiently essential so that their protection is a
pressing and substantial objective. This raises the need to demarcate what
services are essential or when the consequences of a labour disruption are
sufficiently serious to justify interference with the constitutional freedom to
strike.27
The court begins its discussion with the definition of essential services in
international law. For this purpose, they accept a summary of that law presented
in an affidavit filed by Professor Patrick Macklem, who identifies three situations
24. Jackson, 1995, 313 et seqq.; Haney, 1974; Downie/Jackson, 1980.
25. Phillips, 1975, 39 (italics in original); Arthurs, 1971.
26. Saskatchewan, at para. 78.
27. Ibid., para. 86.
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in which the ILO’s supervisory bodies have justified strike restrictions on
essential service grounds:
(1) in the public service only for public servants exercising authority in the
name of the state;
(2) in essential services in the strict sense of the term (that is, services the
interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health
of the whole or part of the population); or
(3) in the event of an acute national emergency and for a limited period of
time.28
Without getting into the details of the contested Saskatchewan legislation,
the SCC found that it was overly broad because ‘the categories of workers whose
right to strike may be abrogated because they provide essential services is
subject to the employer’s unilateral discretion.’29 While the court does not
provide a bright-line definition of essential services, its reference to international
law is significant because in the past the court has expressed the opinion that
freedom of association in Canada should be interpreted as generously as it is in
international law. The court was also disturbed by the absence of a collaborative
process for categorizing services as essential and determining the number of
employees necessary to maintain them.30
Since the SFL decision, there has been one lower court judgment that dealt
directly with the question of whether the government had a pressing and
substantial interest that justified an infringement of the right to strike. The case
arose out of continuing conflicts between the teachers’ unions and the Ontario
provincial government, which the government resolved by passing legislation
that imposed terms and conditions on unions that did not reach an agreement by
a set date. One effect of measure was that it deprived workers of the freedom to
strike that they otherwise would have enjoyed. The unions successfully chal-
lenged the legislation as a violation of their Charter rights. The court accepted
that the legislation substantially interfered with their freedom to strike and held
that the interference was not justified. Central to the court’s holding was its
conclusion that the government’s purpose was fiscal restraint rather than
maintaining or restoring essential services. It then stated: ‘It is only in excep-
tional circumstances that a breach of rights under the Charter will be justified
based on economic concerns.’31
It will take further litigation to clarify where and how courts will draw the
line demarcating services as essential, but it is clear that governments no longer
have the absolute right unilaterally to make that determination.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., para. 87.
30. Ibid., at para. 89.
31. OPSEU v Ontario, 2016 ONSC 2197, at para. 238 (2016).
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5 RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES
5.1 The Constitutional Framework
It is clear that any discussion of statutory restrictions on the right to strike of
employees in essential services must begin with a consideration of Canada’s
newly constitutionalized labour rights, including the right to unionize, the right
to bargain collectively, and the right to strike. We have previously discussed
how this body of law affects the definition of essentiality. Here we discuss the
impact of constitutional labour rights on the government’s power to regulate
essential service strikes by excluding workers from the right to organize,
bargain, or strike, or imposing substantial limits on their exercise.
Canada historically rarely deprived workers of their freedom to form
associations, even for police and other public security workers. As well, it rarely
denied workers the freedom to bargain collectively. Instead, Canada has gener-
ally secured essential services related to public security by denying workers the
freedom to strike – the no-strike model – or limiting the strike to maintain
essential services – the designation model. There are exceptions,32 however,
including members of the armed forces, who are not covered by any collective
bargaining legislation.33
Another exception was the he Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
whose situation merits closer examination because of their recent successful
constitutional challenge to their exclusion from collective labour rights. The
RCMP provides police service at the federal level and for many of Canada’s
provinces and territories. As such, it is the closest thing Canada has to a national
police force. In part because of its long history of involvement in internal security
and strikebreaking, the government was concerned about RCMP officers having
connections to the labour movement. Indeed, from 1918 to 1974 they were
prohibited by an order-in-council from engaging in union-related activity on
pain of instant dismissal.34 When the order-in-council was lifted in 1974, the
head of the RCMP recognized there was a high level of discontent among officers
and instituted the Division Staff Relations Representation Program (DSRRP) to
32. An interesting recent exception was 2003 legislation passed in Quebec, which declared
certain home care and child-care workers not to be employees. The effect of the law was
to remove them from any statutory collective bargaining scheme so that any attempt to
bargain collectively was potentially a violation of competition law. The legislation was
declared unconstitutional in 2008, a year after the SCC recognized that freedom of
association protected collective bargaining. See Confédération des syndicats nationaux c
Québec (Procureur General), 2008 QCCS 5076 (2008).
33. The Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) unsuccessfully petitioned the Canadian
government in 1971 to create statutory collective bargaining schemes for the military. See
PSAC, Collective Bargaining Rights for Members of the Armed Forces (Presented to the
Committee on Legislation Review April 1971).
34. Fudge/Tucker, 2001 and 2010, 100 et seqq. For a history of the restrictions on freedom of
association of RCMP members, see Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 15149 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/2315w>, retrieved
Chapter 5: Canada
117
provide for a weak form of consultation. The program was formalized in
regulation in 1989 and renamed the Staff Relations Representation Program
(SSRP). Then, in 1996, a Pay Council was created to provide officers with a
mechanism for being consulted on compensation issues. RCMP officers chose
representatives to participate in both these bodies, which were the only bodies
the RCMP recognized for the purposes of discussing workplace and wage issues.
Neither body was independent of government nor was there a role for collective
bargaining. Both bodies were limited to consultation.
RCMP officers first challenged their exclusion from any statutory collective
bargaining law in early years of Charter litigation but were unsuccessful. The
SCC embraced a thin interpretation of freedom of association as only protecting
the freedom to form associations. Since the law did not prohibit RCMP officers
from forming associations their Charter rights were not violated.35
In 2006, an independent association of RCMP officers, the Mounted Police
Association of Ontario (MPAO), launched a fresh challenge to the constitution-
ality of the RCMP’s representation scheme. Their case was bolstered in 2007
when the SCC adopted a broader view that freedom of association that protected
collective bargaining and this time the challenge succeeded. The SCC held that
the SRRP substantially failed to provide RCMP officers with a meaningful
process of collective bargaining by denying them representation by an associa-
tion independent of government and by depriving officers of a sufficient degree
of choice in the selection of their representatives. The SCC also rejected the
government’s defence that the infringement was justified because unionization
would compromise the force’s neutrality.36 The effect of the judgment is to limit
severely the power of government to protect essential services by depriving
workers of the right to form independent unions or bargain collectively.
This leaves governments with the option of regulating strikes, but their
power is constitutionally limited. In order to determine whether restrictions on
strikes are constitutional, the court must answer two key questions. The first is
whether the restrictions on the freedom to strike substantially interfere with a
process of collective bargaining. A complete ban on strikes, or even broadly
drawn restrictions, will constitute substantial interference, so this is unlikely to
be the difficult point in litigation. Rather, the key question will be whether the
government can satisfy the court that the interference is demonstrably justified.
The starting point for the justification will be that the freedom to strike is limited
to maintain essential services, which, as discussed in section 4, involves the
court in patrolling the boundaries of what constitute essential services. Assum-
ing the government satisfies the court that it has a pressing and substantial
objective, it must then demonstrate minimum impairment. That inquiry will
on 2018-03-08. Even today, statutes prohibit police from being members of unions that are
affiliated with the labour movement. For example, see Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c
P-15, s 117.
35. Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989 (1999).
36. Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 (2015).
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lead the court to examine the scope of the restrictions, the process by which they
were developed, and the alternative provided to the strike.
Where the government adopts the no-strike model, the court will want to
be satisfied that a less restrictive approach that preserved a limited right to strike
could not have met its legitimate interest in preserving essential services. As
well, it will require that the strike alternative provides the affected workers with
an acceptable substitute, such as binding interest arbitration by a neutral third
party. Where the government has selected a designation model, as in the SFL
case, the court will examine whether the processes for determining which
services are essential and how those essential services will be provided are
minimally impairing.
In the SFL case, the trial judge found that the restrictions went far beyond
what was necessary to maintain essential services. The SCC agreed:
The unilateral authority of public employers to determine whether and how
essential services are to be maintained during a work stoppage with no
adequate review mechanism, and the absence of a meaningful dispute
resolution mechanism to resolve bargaining impasses, justify the trial judge’s
conclusion that the PSESA impairs the s. 2 (d) rights more than is necessary.37
5.2 Securing Essential Services by Exclusion from Collective Labour
Relations Rights (No Right to Bargain Collectively and/or No Right
to Strike)
In general, few Canadian workers are ex ante deprived of the right to bargain
collectively. One such group is employees of the Canadian Security and Intelli-
gence Service. Except for clerical and secretarial employees, they have no right
to bargain or strike. As discussed earlier, RCMP officers were in a similar
situation until the SCC found their exclusion was unconstitutional in 2015. In
response, the government enacted legislation in 2017 that provides RCMP
officers with a process to unionize and bargain collectively.38
It is far more common for governments to deprive essential service workers
ex ante of the right to strike. As mentioned earlier, this is the common approach
to public security workers, such as police, fire-fighters and prison guards. Not
surprisingly, when the federal government provided RCMP officers with a
statutory collective bargaining scheme, they adopted the no-strike model,
providing them with arbitration instead.
Ontario, hospital workers are the other major group subject to the no-strike
model. In 1965 following a strike at a public hospital, the Ontario government
enacted the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act (HLDAA), which provides
that in the event of an impasse the parties are obliged to submit their dispute to
37. Saskatchewan, 81.
38. Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, SC 2017, c 9.
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arbitration.39 Another group of workers recently deprived of the right to strike
are employees of the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC).40 The government
enacted the exclusion in 2011 at the request of the City of Toronto. Prior to the
enactment, the government had ended a number of TTC strikes through
back-to-work legislation.
Workers and unions who strike unlawfully potentially face very serious
penalties regardless of the circumstances. Some no-strike laws specify the
consequences of violations of the law, but many incorporate the laws that
govern unlawful strikes generally. For example, the recent TTC strike law
expressly incorporates by reference the provisions of the Labour Relations Act
(LRA) regarding unlawful strikes.41 All contraventions of the LRA, including
untimely strikes, are regulatory offences for which individuals are liable to fines
of up to $2,000 and unions up to $25,000 for each day they are in violation.
However, prosecutions can only be instituted with the written consent of the
Labour Board. Labour boards also have the power to issue unlawful strike
declarations, which have the same legal effect as a court order. Striking workers
and union leaders who defy court orders could face civil or criminal contempt
proceedings that could result in fines or jail.42
Apart from statute, employers can discipline individual workers who strike
illegally, including termination. Employees can challenge disciplinary action
through the grievance procedure, but arbitrators accept that unlawful striking is
a disciplinary matter, the only issue being whether the severity of the penalty is
justified in the circumstances of the case. As well, employers can bring griev-
ances against the union, which is under a strict obligation not to participate in or
facilitate unlawful strikes and to use its influence to end them when they occur.
Arbitrators have the power to award damages against the union should they
breach the peace obligation.
Unlawful strikes may give rise to tort liability. While there is no nominal
tort of breach of statute (unless it was the intent of the legislature to create such
liability), unlawful strikes by essential service workers will likely be tortious on
other grounds. For example, an action for civil conspiracy using unlawful means
could succeed on the basis that the strike violated a statutory prohibition on
strikes.
In addition to the sanctions discussed above, in some circumstances
essential service workers could be prosecuted for criminal breach of contract.
Under the law, which dates back to 1878, it is a crime to wilfully breach a
contract if you have reasonable cause to believe that the probable consequences
39. For the background and early experience, see White, 1995, 82 et seqq; Arthurs, 1971, 82
et seqq. The current statute is RSO 1990, c H-14.
40. Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, SO 2011, c 2.
41. Ibid., s 17.
42. Fudge/Glasbeek, 1992. In another famous incident, the leader of the postal workers’ union,
Jean-Claude Parrot was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to order his members
back to work after Parliament enacted back-to-work legislation. See R v Parrot, 106 DLR
(3d) 296 (ONCA) (1979) and Mandel/Glasbeek, 1979, 10.
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of doing so will be to endanger human life, cause serious bodily injury, expose
valuable property to serious injury or destruction, deprive the residents of a
municipality of their supply of light, power or gas, or delay or prevent the
running of trains.43 However, the likelihood of prosecution is remote. Indeed, we
have not located a single reported case.44
Strikes in defiance of the no-strike model are uncommon. The authors of a
study of public sector bargaining between 1978 and 2008 found that of the 791
contracts negotiated under this regime, unions struck just 4 times.45 The most
significant strike undertaken by Ontario workers under the no-strike regime was
in 1981 when approximately 10,000 health care workers covered by the HLDAA
walked off the job. The Ontario government obtained a court injunction ordering
the nurses back to work. The leader of the union, Grace Hartman, refused to
order her members back to work and the Attorney General threatened mass
prosecution of union leaders and even possibly of members. The strike collapsed
soon thereafter. Seventeen union leaders were subsequently charged with
contempt. Pursuant to a plea deal, Hartman was sentenced to 45 days of
imprisonment, two other leaders received 15 day sentences, and the remainder
received suspended sentences and were fined $300 each. Striking workers faced
disciplinary action by their employers. Thirty-four local leaders were dismissed
but arbitrators reinstated most, subject to lengthy disciplinary suspensions
without pay. Striking workers were meted out 5,500 letters of reprimand and
3,442 disciplinary suspensions.46 Later that year acute care nurses implemented
a work-to-rule campaign and an overtime ban to show their displeasure over the
lack of progress in negotiations. While these actions are strikes under Ontario
law, no disciplinary action followed.47
To date, unions have not challenged the constitutionality of the no-strike
model, but it only became possible to do so in 2015 after the SFL decision.48 Prior
to that time, unions would have brought their complaints to the ILO. There were
two early complaints by unions in Ontario and Alberta objecting to older
legislation that barred government employees from striking, the Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alberta) and the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining
Act (Ontario).49 In its reports, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA)
found that both statutes were overly broad because they covered employees of
43. Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 422. Craven, 1999, 142 et seqq.
44. But, see Johnston et al v Mackey et al., (1937) 67 CCC 196 (NSSC), where the court held
that a strike involving wilful breaches of contract, where the probable consequence of the
strike would have resulted in serious property damage in violation of the Code, was
tortious.
45. Campolieti/Hebdon/Dachis, 2016, 201.
46. Deverell, 1982, 179; White, 1990, 73 et seqq.
47. Haiven/Haiven, 2002, 5 et seqq.
48. At the time of writing, the Amalgamated Transit Workers Union, Local 113 filed an
application challenging the no-strike legislation, but as of the time of writing there is no
report of the case’s progress. See Kalinowski/Ferguson, 2015.
49. SA 1977, c 40; SO 1972, c 67, s 25.
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crown agencies such as liquor control boards whose work was not essential.
Apart from over-breadth, the Committee found the restrictions were otherwise
justified and that the statutes provided adequate safeguards to protect the
interests of those workers deprived of the right to strike, including adequate,
impartial and binding conciliation, and arbitration procedures.50
The most recent ILO complaint arose out of the 2011 legislation prohibiting
strikes by TTC workers. The Committee did not consider metropolitan transpor-
tation to be an essential service in the strict sense of the term, but it recognized
urban transit as a public service of primary importance where the requirement of
a minimum service might be justified.51 Both Ontario and Alberta subsequently
replaced the no-strike model for public sector workers with a controlled strike
model, but in neither case was the action taken as a response to the CFA’s
findings. Rather, in both provinces, their first elected New Democratic Party
government made the change.52
5.3 Securing Essential Services by Imposing Limitations on the Right to
Strike (Controlled Strike Model)
The controlled strike model is the predominant approach to regulating essential
service strikes in Canada that do not involve public security service workers. The
approach was first adopted by the Federal government when it created a
statutory collective bargaining scheme for the federal public service in the Public
Service Staff Relations Act in 1967 (PSSRA)(now the Federal Public Service
Labour Relations Act (FPSLRA).53 The PSSRA was unusual in that it offered
unions the choice between the no-strike model, leading to binding arbitration,
and the controlled strike model. Many governments subsequently adopted the
controlled-strike model when they created public sector statutory collective
bargaining schemes, although most did not offer unions the choice of opting for
the no-strike/binding interest arbitration model, except under limited circum-
stances.
Three Canadian jurisdictions also integrated the controlled strike model
into their private sector collective bargaining statutes where the unfettered strike
model is the norm. One justification for imposing ex ante restrictions on private
sector strikes is that private sector workers are increasingly performing work
50. Interim Report – Report No 187, Nov. 1978, Case No 893 (Canada) – Complaint date:
04-NOV-77 – Closed; Definitive Report – Report No 214, March 1982, Case No 1071
(Canada) – Complaint date: 06-JUL-81 – Closed.
51. Report in which the committee requests to be kept informed of development – Report No
377, March, 2016, Case No 3107 (Canada) – Complaint date: 05-DEC-14 – Follow-up.
52. For Ontario, SO 1993, c 38, for Alberta, SA 2016, c 10.
53. SC 1967, c 72. In 2003, the statute was renamed the Public Service Labour Relations Act, SC
2003, c 22 and in 2017 it was renamed again as the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations
Act, S.C. 2017, c. 9. Unless I am making specific reference to an earlier version of the
legislation, I will use FPSLRA acronym. On the origins and background of the act, see
Arthurs, 1971, ch. 3, and Rootham, 2007, 27 et seqq.
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that is vital to public health and safety. For example, a 1995 Task Force Report
recommended there be a designation process in the Canada Labour Code (CLC),
in part because privatization of certain crucial functions, like air traffic control,
shifted their labour relations from the FPSLRA to the CLC.54
As well, in British Columbia and Quebec, the use of replacement workers
during strikes is highly restricted. As a result, the risk increases that a work
stoppage could significantly disrupt the production of goods and services
necessary for the public’s health and safety or result in substantial property
damage or deterioration, thus providing a justification for ex ante strike restric-
tions.55
It is not possible to provide an account of the many variations on the
controlled strike model in Canada and so we will focus on two, the FPSLRA and
the CLC.
5.3.1 Federal Public Service Labour Relations Act
The designation process under the FPSLRA has been quite controversial and has
undergone at least three major changes. At the time of writing, it is likely to
revert to the model that was in place prior to the most recent changes in 2013.
In its first iteration, the act defined essential services narrowly as ‘a service,
facility or activity of the Government of Canada that is or will be, at any time,
necessary for the safety or security of the public or a segment of the public.’ This
definition closely tracked the ILO’s definition. The government initiated the
designation process by proposing a list of designated positions and then the
parties bargained in an attempt to reach an agreement. If the parties could not
agree, the Public Service Staff Relations Board had jurisdiction to resolve the
matter. A 1982 SCC judgment, CATCA, narrowly interpreted the scope of the
board’s powers, so that it could only determine which services were essential,
but could not interfere with the government’s determination of the level of
service required.56 The effect of the SCC’s judgment was to expand the govern-
ment’s power to designate and, in the following years, the percentage of public
service positions designated as essential jumped sharply.57 However, because
unions had the option of electing arbitration, they could opt out of the controlled
strike model if designation levels made the strike option ineffective.
54. For a discussion of the background to the adoption of the designation model and its
rationale, see Adell, 2001, 28 et seqq.
55. For a discussion and strong expression of judicial support for limiting the freedom to strike
to protect essential services, see Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v
Montreal (City), [1997] 1 SCR 793 (1997).
56. Canadian Air Traffic Control Association v Canada (Treasury Board), [1982] 1 SCR 696
(1982).
57. Adell, 2001, 30 et seqq.; Swimmer, 1995, 377 et seqq.; Panitch/Swartz, 2003, 93 et seqq.;
Finkelman, 1986, 691 (limited use of designations prior to CATCA; effect of SCC judgment
severely limits capability of union to mount an effective strike).
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The government tweaked the model in 2003 after a lengthy review process
by an Advisory Committee and a Task Force. The government repealed and
replaced the PSSRA with the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA). With
regard to essential services, the new law aimed to strengthen the role of
negotiation in creating essential service agreements. It required the government
to notify the union within 20 days after the union gave notice to bargain that it
considered employees in the bargaining unit occupied essential service posi-
tions. The parties were then required to begin good faith bargaining to enter into
an essential services agreement. This involved a three step process. First, it was
necessary to determine which services are necessary to insure public safety or
security in the vent of a strike. If the parties cannot agree, the PSLRB (now the
Federal Public Service Labour and Employment Relations Board (FPSLREB) will
decide the issue. The next step is to determine the level of service to be
performed during a strike. This question is determined exclusively by the
employer, subject to very limited review. Once these two matters are settled, the
third step is to determine the types, number and specific positions necessary to
provide the essential services at the designated level of service. If the parties
cannot agree, the FPSLREB will decide the issue.58
The third iteration was enacted in 2013 by a Conservative government that
was quite hostile toward organized labour. Bill C-4, Economic Action Plan Act
2013 No. 2, greatly expanded the power of the government to act unilaterally in
almost every phase of the designation process. The amended act provides:
Section 119(1): The employer has the exclusive right to determine whether
any service, facility or activity of the Government of Canada is essential
because it is or will be necessary for the safety or security of the public or a
segment of the public.
While the statute preserved a narrow definition of essential service, it
granted the government near total discretion to determine what activities fit
within it. The statute also gave the government the exclusive right to designate
which positions perform essential services. While the law requires the govern-
ment to consult with the union after it has made its decision, the union has no
power to challenge the decision and submit the disagreement to the FPSLREB for
a determination. Furthermore, the option of selecting arbitration rather than the
controlled strike model is sharply limited so that unions can only demand
arbitration if 80% ormore of the bargaining unit is designated as essential. Given
the power of the government, this creates an incentive to designate just under
80% of the bargaining unit leaving the union with an ineffective strike weapon
and little or no bargaining power. Moreover, even in those circumstances when
a union can opt for arbitration, the government changed the rules to tilt
58. See PSLRA, S.C. 2003, c. 22; Rootham, 2007, 195 et seqq. for a lengthy description.
Subsequent cases further clarified the process. For a summary, see Professional Institute of
the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 143 (CanLII). The
change in the name of the labour board was made in 2017. See S.C. 2017, c. 9.
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arbitration outcomes in its direction. It lists two factors to which the arbitrator
must give preponderant weight. While one of these factors existed in the
previous model, the necessity of attracting and retaining public servants, the
second is new. It requires the arbitrator to give preponderant weight to ‘Cana-
da’s fiscal circumstances relative to its stated budgetary policies.’ This sharply
steers arbitrations toward outcomes favourable to the government, compared to
prior language requiring consideration of ability to pay, which arbitrators treated
cautiously because of the power of government to increase taxes.59
The 2013 version of the law remains on the books but the current Liberal
government introduced legislation in 2016 to repeal the 2013 amendments.60
The more labour friendly orientation of the Liberals is one motivation for the
change, but the more important story is the constitutional one. In order to
determine whether the Charter right to strike has been violated, the court asks
‘whether the legislative interference with the right to strike in a particular case
amounts to substantial interference with collective bargaining.’61 In the SFL
case, the court was considering Saskatchewan’s Public Service Essential Services
Act (PSESA), passed in 2008, which introduced a designation model for regulat-
ing essential service strikes.62 The SCC found that the PSESA violated the right to
strike ‘because it prevents designated employees from engaging in any work
stoppage as part of the bargaining process.’63 Of course, this is true for all
designation models, so the constitutionality of the law will depend on whether
the violation can be justified under s. 1.
The SCC accepted that the ‘maintenance of essential public services is
self-evidently a pressing and substantial objective’ and that the prohibition on
strikes including the sanctions imposed on violators of the essential service
restrictions are rationally connected to the goal of maintaining essential public
services. ‘The determinative issue here, in my view, is whether the means
chosen by the government are minimally impairing…’64
The SCC found the government went well beyond what was reasonably
required to protect its legitimate interest in the maintenance of public services.
First, the legislation provided the government with unilateral discretion to
identify by regulation which services are essential without any opportunity for
discussion or access to an impartial and effective process to dispute the
government’s determination. Second, the law also provided that in the event an
essential services agreement is not reached, the employer had the unilateral
power to determine how essential services would be maintained, including the
classifications of employees who must continue to work and the number and
59. S.C. 2013, c. 40; Rootham et al., 2013; Goldman/Scott, 2013.
60. Bill C-34, An Act to amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act and other Acts, 42nd
Parliament, 1st Session (2016).
61. Saskatchewan, para. 78.
62. Public Service Essential Services Act, SS 2008, c P-42.2.
63. Saskatchewan, at para. 78.
64. Ibid., paras. 79 et seq.
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names of employees within each classification. Finally, the SCC also found the
act failed to provide access to a meaningful alternative mechanism for resolving
bargaining disputes, such as arbitration. The court summed up its findings:
Given the breadth of essential services that the employer is entitled to
designate unilaterally without an independent review process, and the ab-
sence of an adequate, impartial and effective alternative mechanism for
resolving collective bargaining impasses, there can be little doubt that the trial
judge was right to conclude that the scheme was not minimally impairing.65
The FPSLRA clearly violates the right to strike. The only question is
whether the violation is minimally impairing. Based on the SFL judgment, it is
almost certain the current law could not be justified under s. 1. It allows the
government unilaterally designate which services are essential without access to
an effective and impartial process to dispute the government’s determination,
and it severely limits access to arbitration when extensive designations deprive
bargaining units of the effective ability to strike.
Interestingly, the Canadian Labour Congress filed a complaint with the ILO
regarding the 2013 legislation after the SFL judgment, perhaps in the belief it
would provide it with additional leverage in lobbying the federal government to
amend the FPSLRA.66 Although at the time of writing the amending legislation
has not moved beyond first reading, which occurred on 28 November 2016, in
the most recent round of bargaining the government offered all affected unions
the option of selecting interest arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism,
essentially putting them back in the pre-2013 regime.
5.3.2 Canada Labour Code
As noted earlier, the CLC is one of the few private sector collective bargaining
statutes that deals with essential service strikes ex ante and does so through the
designation model. The CLC provides:
87.4 (1) During a strike or lockout not prohibited by this Part, the employer,
the trade union and the employees in the bargaining unit must continue the
supply of services, operation of facilities or production of goods to the extent
necessary to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health
of the public.
The law provides that within fifteen days after notice to bargain has been
given either the employer or the union may give notice of the services that must
be provided in the event of a strike or lockout and the number of employees in
the bargaining unit that would be required for that purpose. If the parties are
65. Ibid., at para. 96.
66. By the time the Committee issued its definitive report in March, 2017, the Canadian
government had introduced a measure to repeal Bill C-4. See ILO Case No. 3143 –
Complaint Date 13-May-2015; Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 381st
Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, GB.329/INS/17, at paras. 173–219.
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unable to reach an essential services agreement, either may refer outstanding
differences to the labour board. The Minister of Labour may intervene in the
labour board’s hearing to provide her views on what is required to maintain
essential services. The law gives the board broad powers to determine what
services are essential and to specify the manner and extent to which those
services are to be provided. The board also has the power to review and modify
its orders during a strike or lockout. Finally, if the board is satisfied the provision
of essential services will render the strike or lockout ineffective, it may direct
that binding arbitration be available to resolve the dispute (s. 87.4 (2) – (8)).67
In addition to the formal designation process, the law grants the Minister
extraordinarily wide discretionary power:
107. The Minister, where the Minister deems it expedient, may do such things
as to the Minister seem likely to maintain or secure industrial peace and to
promote conditions favourable to the settlement of industrial disputes or
differences and to those ends the Minister may refer any question to the Board
or direct the Board to do such things as the Minister deems necessary.
As we shall see in Section 7 of this chapter, the Minister has used this
section to bypass the designation process.
5.4 General Observations on the Controlled or Designated Strike Model
Strikes in violation of the designation provision are rare in Canada. Indeed,
strikes under the designation model are uncommon. A study of public sector
strikes between 1978 and 2008 found that among the 422 contracts negotiated
under this regime, unions struck 34 times or in about 8.0% of all negotiations.68
This study did not identify which strikes, if any, were illegal. However, it seems
illegal strikes under the designation model are exceedingly rare. For example,
Haiven & Haiven’s examination of strikes in the Canadian health care sector
between 1999 and 2002, identified only one unlawful strike among those
governed by the designation model, and that dispute was resolved within a few
days with no record of disciplinary action being taken.69 The penalties against a
union or a designated essential service worker who strikes unlawfully are much
the same as those available against workers and unions who strike unlawfully
under the no-strike model.
As mentioned earlier, the designation model violates the right to strike, so
to pass constitutional muster it must be justified on the basis that it was enacted
to achieve a pressing and substantial objective and that the means used
minimally impaired the right to strike. Depending on how the courts interpret
67. For a brief overview, see Adell, 2001, 32 et seqq.
68. Campolieti/Hebdon/Dachis, 2016, 201. It is interesting to note that the frequency of strikes
under this model is nearly double the frequency under the right-to-strike model (4.6%).
69. Haiven/Haiven, 2002, 8 et seq.
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these requirements, they impose a counterweight to the propensity of govern-
ments to extend its control over the designation process in order to increase
designations, while restricting or barring access to arbitration when the result is
to render strikes ineffective.
6 COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR RESTRICTIONS
It bears repeating that the constitutional right to strike recognized in the 2015
SFL case constrains the government in its choice of alternatives when strikes are
prohibited or controlled. The SCC considers the quid quo pro in the context of
the s. 1 defence, where it asks whether the violation was minimally impairing. In
the SFL case, the SCC did not really have to consider the suitability of substitutes
because the legislation failed at an earlier step in the analysis. However, the
court did point to the failure of the law to provide ‘any access to a meaningful
alternative mechanism for resolving impasses, such as arbitration.’70 The court
then cited former Chief Justice Dickson’s dissenting opinion in the Alberta
Reference case, which it has now embraced, on the need for a fair and effective
substitute:
Clearly, if the freedom to strike were denied and no effective and fair means
for resolving bargaining disputes were put in its place, employees would be
denied any input at all in ensuring fair and decent working conditions, and
labour relations law would be skewed entirely to the advantage of the
employer. It is for this reason that legislative prohibition of freedom to strike
must be accompanied by a mechanism for dispute resolution by a third
party…The purpose of such a mechanism is to ensure that the loss in
bargaining power through legislative prohibition of strikes is balanced by
access to a system which is capable of resolving in a fair, effective and
expeditious manner disputes which arise between employees and employ-
ers.71
In the SFL case, the law provided no alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism for bargaining units that lost an effective right to strike. As a result, the SCC
did not need to elaborate on what would be a fair and effective substitute.
The approach taken in the Saskatchewan legislation was highly unusual.
The common practice in most essential service schemes is to provide impartial
binding interest arbitration as the alternative to the right to strike. This is
certainly true when the no-strike model is adopted, such as is the case for police,
firefighters, hospital workers and, most recently in Ontario, Toronto transit
workers. In the context of the designation or controlled strike model, the usual
practice is to provide access to arbitration either by election of the union, or
when the percentage of bargaining unit members prohibited from striking
exceeds a certain percentage, rendering the right to strike ineffective. The PSLRA
originally adopted the former approach, while the 2013 amendment introduced
70. Saskatchewan, para. 93.
71. Ibid., para. 94.
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the latter, with 80% being the magic number. If passed, Bill C-34 will restore the
election model. If not, it is arguable that the law will fail to pass constitutional
muster because of the very restrictive access it provides to arbitration as an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The arbitration model used in Canada generally complies with the ILO’s
protocol, which requires access, independence, and binding-ness. The largest
conflict has arisen around various attempts by government to tilt the proceed-
ings in the employer’s favour by requiring arbitrators to take into account the
government’s ability to pay. For example, the TTC legislation requires the
arbitrator to consider the following factors:72
(1) The employer’s ability to pay in light of its fiscal situation.
(2) The extent to which services may have to be reduced, in light of the
decision or award, if current funding and taxation levels are not
increased.
(3) The economic situation in Ontario and the City of Toronto.
(4) A comparison, as between the employees and other comparable em-
ployees in the public and private sectors, of the terms and conditions of
employment and the nature of the work performed.
(5) The employer’s ability to attract and retain qualified employees.
While the last three considerations would likely be viewed as neutral and
widely accepted in arbitral jurisprudence, the first two are part of a more recent
trend to bend arbitral awards in the direction of employer interests. Neverthe-
less, the ILO’s Committee of Freedom of Association found the prescribed
considerations to be acceptable because they ‘would appear to allow for
sufficient discretion and flexibility.’73
It should also be noted that Canadian interest arbitrators have traditionally
resisted giving great weight to employer ability to pay arguments, if only because
the government’s ability to pay is, to a significantly degree, a function of its own
fiscal policies. As one prominent arbitrator stated:
Interest arbitrators in the Canadian public sector have, apparently, universally
rejected the legitimacy of an ‘ability to pay’ argument. They have not allowed
governments as employers to hide behind their own skirts in their role as the
source of funds, to escape pay increases indicated by the other criteria.74
This attitude, and the belief that strengthening the ability to pay criteria
would reduce wage premiums associated with arbitration (see below), has
recently led governments to require arbitrators to take into account the govern-
ment’s fiscal situation and policies in making their awards. Indeed, the same
72. Toronto Transit Commission, supra Section 5.1.
73. Case No. 3107, para. 242.
74. University of Toronto (13 Feb 1981) (Christie) at 8, cited in Atlantic Pilotage Authority v
Canadian Merchant Service Guild, [2006] CLAD No 457 (Christie), at para. 37.
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arbitrator quoted above returned to the issue 25 years later and expressed amore
nuanced view:
In a 2004 interest arbitration between The Saint John Board of Police
Commissioners and the Saint John Police Protective Association, CUPE, Local
61 (June 9, 2004, unreported) the I stated:
I continue to adhere to the views of interest arbitrators as I saw them in the
University of Toronto Award with respect to a ‘pure’ ability to pay
argument by an employer in an interest arbitration. By this I mean the
argument that a public employer lacks ‘ability to pay’ because there is no
money allocated in its budget, or in the budget of the employer’s govern-
mental funding body. On the other hand, I accept that what constitutes an
appropriate wage settlement may well be affected by the economic circum-
stances in which a public employer finds itself. I also recognize that these
two concepts may be very closely related.
Thus, while a public sector employer’s budget, whether self-imposed or
struck by another government funding agency, cannot be accepted as a simple
proxy for economic circumstances, what constitutes an appropriate wage
settlement may well be affected by economic circumstances.75
The other way some governments have attempted to influence the outcome
of interest arbitration is by intervening in the appointment process. Although
statutes vary, the common practice is that only individuals mutually agreeable to
the parties are appointed. However, in an effort to influence the process, in 1995,
a newly elected Conservative government abandoned the practice of appointing
experienced arbitrators and instead appointed retired judges, without consulting
with the unions involved. The first four judges approached by the government
refused the appointment but it found other retired judges who agreed to take the
position. The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) challenged the
government’s action on administrative law grounds since at the time courts had
not recognized constitutional labour rights. The case went to the SCC, which
held that the minister’s exercise of authority was patently unreasonable:
The Minister, as a matter of law, was required to exercise his power of
appointment in a manner consistent with the purpose and objects of the
statute that conferred the power. A fundamental purpose and object of the
…HLDAA… was to provide an adequate substitute for strikes and lockouts.
To achieve the statutory purpose, as the Minister himself wrote on February 2,
1998, ‘the parties must perceive the system as neutral and credible’. … I
would … affirm the fundamental principle … that the HLDAA required the
Minister to select arbitrators from candidates who were qualified not only by
their impartiality, but by their expertise and general acceptance in the labour
relations community.76
There is a large literature examining the impact of different dispute
resolution mechanisms on collective bargaining outcomes. For example, interest
arbitration has often been criticized because of its so-called chilling and narcotic
75. Ibid., at paras. 39 et seq.
76. CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para. 49.
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effects: the parties become dependent on arbitration to resolve their difference
and hence become less able to achieve mutually acceptable bargaining out-
comes. Joseph Rose reviewed the Canadian research and found that it strongly
supported the conclusion that arbitration is associated with low settlement
rates.77 Rose also found that arbitration results in protracted delays in achieving
settlement.78
The greatest concern, however, is on the model’s impact on wage settle-
ments. Initial studies focused on the no-strike model versus the right-to-strike
model. One of the earliest Canadian studies found that while the switch to the
no-strike model reduced dispute costs, the trade-off was higher wage costs. The
study also found that ability to pay did not influence arbitrated outcomes.79 A
much more recent study by Campolieti, Hebdon, and Dachis compared the
impact of the three models on wage outcomes over the period from 1978 to 2008.
The authors found that the no-strike model with compulsory arbitration pro-
duced a higher wage premium compared to the right-to-strike model. As well,
they found that legislative strengthening of the ability to pay criterion did not
reduce the wage premium. They also found that the designation or controlled
strike model was associated with a statistically significant decrease in wages
relative to the right-to-strike model, making it the least favourable for unionized
public sector workers. The reasons for this are not hard to fathom. Essential
service designation reduces the effectiveness of the strike threat, especially in a
context in which the percentage of bargaining unit members designated as
essential has been increasing and access to arbitration as an alternative to
limited strikes has been decreasing.80
7 SECURING ESSENTIAL SERVICES BY FURTHER MEANS
In addition to the three models for regulating essential service strikes discussed
so far (right to strike; no-right to strike; and controlled strike), governments in
Canada have invoked other powers in an ad hoc manner to end or postpone
otherwise legal strikes. Indeed, the frequent use of such measures led Leo
Panitch and Don Swartz to claim that we are living in a state of ‘permanent
exceptionalism’, while Bernie Adell has suggested the emergence of a fourth
model of regulation, the ‘instant back-to-work model.’81 The principal tool here
is back-to-work (BTW) legislation, where governments terminate lawful strikes
by ad hoc, post-dispute statutory enactments, although a few statutes grant the
77. Rose, 2008, 552. Earlier studies include: Anderson/Thomas, 1977; Rose, 1996; Hebdon/
Mazerolle, 2003. A more recent study reached similar conclusions. See Campolieti/
Hebdon/Dachis, 2016, 202 et seqq.
78. Rose, 2008, 551.
79. Currie/McConnell, 1991, 693.
80. Campolieti/Hebdon/Dachis, 2016. Also, see Dachis, 2008
81. Panitch/Swartz, 2003, 423.
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executive extraordinary power to intervene on an ad hoc basis to end or
postpone strikes. Collectively, these will be referred to as BTW measures.
A good example of this kind of ad hoc intervention occurred at the time I
was writing this chapter. College teachers in Ontario went on a lawful strike that
affected 500,000 students. Negotiations were bogged down and after five weeks
the Ontario government enacted BTW legislation.82 While post-secondary edu-
cation is clearly not an essential service and college teachers enjoy the right to
strike, the government ended the strike when it became convinced that an end
was not in sight and the strike’s continuation threatened to put the students’
terms in jeopardy. In its view, the substantial harm to the public justified this ad
hoc intervention. The act provides for mediation/arbitration to resolve the
dispute. The union has promised to challenge the measure’s constitutionality,
but I suspect it will face an uphill battle.83
BTW legislation ending strikes at post-secondary institutions is rare, but
BTW measures are not. Since 1950, governments in Canada resorted to back to
work measures 169 times.84 A comprehensive analysis of trends in the usage of
these measures is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it should be noted
that they were used quite infrequently prior to the 1970s. Not surprising, the
frequency of their use increased with the retreat from Keynesianism and the
beginnings of the neo-liberal turn in the mid-1970s. Interestingly, the use of
BTW measures has declined recently. Since 2003, Canadian governments
deployed BTW measures fifteen times. However, this decline should be viewed
in the context of the decline in strike frequency in both the public and private
sectors noted earlier.
BTW measures are used most frequently to end strikes in the education
(primary and secondary), health care, and transportation and communication
sectors. For jurisdictional reasons, provincial governments are responsible for
BTW measures in education, health care and local transport, while the federal
government is largely responsible for BTW measures in inter-provincial trans-
port and communications.
When governments use BTW measures, they must decide how the dispute
should be resolved. Again, a detailed study of the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms invoked is beyond the scope of this study, but the Canadian Foundation of
Labour Rights (CFLR) maintains a database of BTW measures from 1982 to the
present, which records whether the dispute was resolved by arbitration or by a
government imposed settlement. According to their calculation, binding arbitra-
tion was used in 40 of the 90 recorded cases. However, a perusal of the
‘settlement imposed’ cases reveals that they include a diversity of settlement
procedures, including instances where particular terms were imposed but others
were sent to arbitration, or where final offer selection was ordered rather than
82. Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, SO 2017,
c 21.
83. Breen, 2017.
84. Panitch/Swartz, 2003, 184; Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights, 2018.
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interest arbitration. Therefore, while it is certainly the case that governments do
impose settlements, the CFLR’s database likely overstates its frequency.85
One additional factor that influences the use of BTW measures is the
political orientation of the government in power. Broadly speaking, conservative
governments are more likely to invoke BTW measures than more liberal ones. I
have intentionally not attached party labels to these descriptors, however,
because in the current context in which parties of all stripes have embraced or at
least accepted the austerity agenda, the use of BTW measures cannot be neatly
mapped onto the political label of the party in power.86
That said, it will be helpful to provide an illustration of the way BTW
measures were used by the last Conservative federal government in 2011.87 The
first strike in which this government directly intervened was by the Canadian
Union of Postal Workers. The union adopted the tactic of short, local rotating
strikes. It did this because there is a history of the federal government ending
their strikes through BTW work legislation on the basis that the disruption
endangered the safety and security of the public, even though governments have
not declared Canada Post to be an essential service. The union aimed to avoid
this outcome because brief rotating local strikes did not realistically pose any
threat to the public. The rotating strikes started on 2 June 2011 and continued
until 15 June when Canada Post declared a national lockout. On the same day,
the Minister of Labour, Lisa Raitt, announced the government would be intro-
ducing BTW legislation. Minister Raitt justified the government’s action by
referring to the impact of the dispute ‘on Canadians and on the Canadian
economy.’88 There was no suggestion that the rotating strikes endangered the
safety or security of the public.
The bill was introduced on 20 June and passed and received Royal Assent
on 26 June, after a 58-hour filibuster by the opposition. Rather than send the
entire dispute to arbitration, the government imposed a wage settlement that
was less generous than the employer’s last offer and left other outstanding
matters to be resolved by final offer selection.89
On 14 June, in the midst of the postal workers strike, the Canadian
Autoworkers (CAW) announced that its 3,800 members employed by Air
Canada in sales and services were going on strike following 10 weeks of
negotiation. Although Air Canada is a private carrier, on 16 June, the Minister
announced she was tabling BTW legislation. When questioned, the Minister
responded that the strike would cause economic difficulty for Canadians, even
though reports suggested that the economic effects of the strike were minimal
and her own department advised against using BTW legislation because the
85. Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights, 2018.
86. Evans/Smith, 2015.
87. Generally, see Stevens/Nesbitt, 2014, 118.
88. Quoted in Lee, 2012, 216.
89. Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act, SC 2011, c 17.
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walkout was little more than a nuisance.90 The union and the employer reached
an agreement later that day.
That was not the end of Air Canada’s troubles. Its unionized flight
attendants rejected tentative deals negotiated by the union in August and
October 2011. Following the second rejection, the union gave notice that it was
going to strike on 13 October. The Minister stated that the government would
intervene. ‘We will be clear that a work stoppage is unacceptable in this time of
fragile economy.’91 The House was not sitting and so it would have been
necessary to call it back into session to pass BTW legislation. Minister Raitt
discovered a way around this and invoked her power under the little-used s. 107
of the CLC, referred to earlier, that empowers the Minister to ‘do such things as
to the Minister seem likely to maintain or secure industrial peace…’ She referred
the dispute to the Canadian Industrial Relations Board asking it to determine
whether the rejection of the two tentative agreements by the bargaining unit
‘created conditions that are unfavourable to the settlement of the industrial
dispute at hand.’92 This was, of course, a nonsensical question, but it had the
effect of precluding a strike until the Board addressed the matter. The parties
subsequently agreed to refer their dispute to binding arbitration.
Air Canada still had to settle with its baggage handlers, represented by the
IAMAW, and pilots, represented by Air Canada Pilots Association. The baggage
handlers rejected a tentative deal and on 6 March 2012, the union gave strike
notice. Within 24 hours Air Canada notified the pilots that they would be locked
out. Before a strike or lockout materialized, on 12 March Minister Raitt intro-
duced Bill C-33, which prohibited strikes and lockouts and substituted final offer
selection for the resolution of any outstanding matters. The bill sped through the
legislative process and received royal assent on 15 March.93
The baggage handlers responded with wildcat strikes, the first occurring in
Toronto when Minister Raitt landed there. Air Canada disciplined three partici-
pating workers, but an arbitrator subsequently substituted a three-day suspen-
sion. Air Canada later disciplined eight organizers of the protest. Of these eight,
four resigned and two were later reinstated. Wildcat strikes spread to Montreal
and Air Canada fired 37 baggage handlers, although arbitrators subsequently
reinstated most. Union officials stepped in and called for the wildcat actions to
end, as required by law. Some Air Canada pilots subsequently conducted a
‘sick-out’ in protest, but the CIRB ruled that the action was an unlawful strike in
violation of the BTW legislation and ordered it to end. The pilots’ union was also
under and obligation to counsel its members to end the job action, which it did,
and the protest ended.94
90. Stevens/Nesbitt, 2014, 127.
91. Quoted in Lee, 2012, 217 et seq.
92. Ibid., at 218.
93. Protecting Air Services Act, SC 2012, c 2.
94. Stevens/Nesbitt, 2014, 127 et seq.
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Of course, these BTW measures were undertaken prior to the SCC’s
recognition of a constitutional right to strike. Nevertheless, the Canadian Union
of PostalWorkers (CUPW) launched a Charter challenge, and the court delivered
its judgment in 2016, after the SFL decision.95 Justice Firestone found that the
legislation clearly abrogated the union members’ right to strike. The only
question was whether the violation was demonstrably justified. The judge found
that the government had a pressing and substantial objective in preventing a
postal disruption but that the legislation was not minimally impairing. In
particular, he found that the imposition of a wage settlement by the government
violated the requirement to provide an impartial substitute for the strike. He also
found that the process for appointing the arbitrator was flawed because the
parties were not consulted. Notably, even before the Charter challenge, the
Federal court quashed the first two appointments, the second on the ground of
a reasonable apprehension of bias.96
As with other areas of strike regulation, governments will now have to
defend the constitutionality of BTW measures and this may discourage their
promiscuous use. However, the level of constitutional protection will depend on
the future development of the case law.
Before leaving this section, it is also necessary to advert to an additional
mechanism for securing essential services, informal agreements or unilateral
undertakings by the union. Haiven and Haiven’s research demonstrates that
health care unions covered by the unfettered strike model maintained essential
health care services during strikes. They did this both because of their commit-
ment to professional responsibility and because they understood that unless
these services were provided critical public support would be lost and govern-
ments would likely step in with BTW measures. In these situations, nurses
tended to go beyond what was necessary and undermined their own bargaining
leverage.97
8 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
Because of the jurisdictional and legislative diversity that characterizes Cana-
dian labour law, this study has focused on Ontario and the Federal jurisdiction
and has not attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of the practice of
essential service strike regulation.98 Nevertheless, our discussion has ranged
over the principal models currently used and has touched on important cases
that have arisen in other Canadian jurisdictions. Therefore, the picture presented
95. Canadian Union of Postal Workers v Her Majesty in Right of Canada, 2016 ONSC 418.
(Disclosure: I provided an expert witness affidavit in support of the union’s claim).
96. Ibid., paras 194 et seqq. Unions representing workers various groups of Air Canada
employees also challenged the BTW measures. These cases have now been settled.
97. Haiven/Haiven, 2002, 44 et seqq.
98. See Adell, 2015, for a broader although by no means comprehensive study of Canadian
essential service strike regulation.
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is a fair representation of the ‘Canadian’ approach to the regulation of strikes in
essential services.
As this study has demonstrated, Canada uses three models to regulate
essential service strikes: 1) the unfettered strike model (backstopped by BTW
measures); 2) the no-strike model; and 3) the designation model. I assess each
model according to the following criteria: its effectiveness at maintaining a
proper level of service; supporting effective collective bargaining; and its
compliance with constitutional and international standards.
8.1 The Unfettered Strike Model (Including BTW Measures)
As we have seen, the unfettered strike model does not generally operate in
sectors where services are essential in the strict sense, such as in police and
fire-fighting. However, it does apply to some groups of workers who provide
services that, if withdrawn for an extended period, could cause significant harm
to the public. Teachers are a good example.
Intuitively, one might think the unfettered strike model is ineffective at
maintaining essential services. After all, it cannot guarantee the maintenance of
essential services during a strike. However, defenders of the unfettered strike
model argue that notwithstanding this possibility, the reality is quite different.
As we have seen, Haiven and Haiven present evidence that health care workers
under the unfettered-strike model voluntarily maintained essential services
during their work stoppages. Indeed, they argued that the level of service
exceeded what was necessary and thereby undermined the efficacy of their
strike.99 There are no examples of health care workers taking industrial action
that endangered patient safety.
On the other hand, there have been rare instances where police and
fire-fighters took advantage of their right to strike and failed to provide essential
services, with serious consequences.100 As well, there have also been instances
where lengthy teachers’ strikes, if allowed to continue, might have caused
serious harm to the public, either because students were at risk of losing a term
or because of the challenges parents faced in providing childcare, and there was
no prospect that voluntary arrangements would avoid the harm.
On balance, it would be fair to conclude that the unfettered strike model is
only moderately effective at securing essential services and for this reason never
applies to workers providing essential services in the strict sense of the term,
such as police, fire-fighters and prison guards. As well, it rarely applies to public
service workers generally. Rather, the model tends to be applied to workers who
provide services where a withdrawal poses no immediate threat to the public.
However, as we have noted, the unfettered strike model actually does not
exist in Canada for workers when an extended withdrawal of services could
99. Haiven/Haiven, 2002, 44 et seqq.
100. Adams, 1993.
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result in serious harm to the public, since governments enjoy – and exercise –
the power to end lawful strikes through back to work measures. From a purely
functional perspective, this feature significantly reduces the risk that the Cana-
dian right to strike model fails to protect essential services. Indeed, given the
frequent use of BTW measures, their use against strikes that did not threaten
essential services, and the hasty resort to these measures, sometimes even
before workers have gone on strike, it is arguable governments are using BTW
measures in a manner that goes beyond what is needed to maintain a proper
level of service.
This observation has important implications for the efficiency of collective
bargaining under the right-to-strike/BTW measures model because if the parties
believe that the government’s tolerance for strikes or lockouts is limited they
may be disinclined to agree to concessions or compromises. This can be
especially true for employers if they believe the BTW measures will tilt the
outcome in their favour. The most glaring example of this was in the Canada
Post negotiations where the employer locked out its workers out, presumably
knowing this would provide the government with an excuse to pass BTW
legislation favourable to its position. Even where the government does not act
quickly, the knowledge that the government will terminate the strike sooner or
later may discourage the employer from making concessions on novel bargain-
ing demands that challenge traditional management rights, knowing that arbi-
trators are unlikely to alter the status quo. Moreover, it is also important to keep
in mind that during public sector strikes, the employer will often be saving
money so that it can afford to wait until the government steps in. This was
arguably management’s strategy in the recent Ontario college teachers’ strike,
discussed previously.
Finally, the unfettered strike model obviously does not violate the consti-
tutional right to strike or international labour standards. So the real question is
whether the use of BTW measures complies with these rights and standards. As
we have seen, this may or may not be the case, depending on the circumstances
in which these measures are used and the alternative provided. For example, the
intervention of the Canadian government to end Canada Post’s lockout of its
workers was found to both violate the ILO’s principles of freedom of association
and Canada’s Charter.101
8.2 The No-Strike Model
The no-strike model is generally effective at ensuring that essential services are
maintained without interruption, but not perfect. Strikes by workers subject to
this model are rare, but there certainly have been instances when Canadian
workers defied the law by engaging in various job actions, including full strikes,
despite the risk they and their union will suffer significant penalties as a result.
101. Canadian Union of Postal Workers; ILO, Case No 2894 (2011).
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This model is most frequently applied to workers providing essential services in
the strict sense. Its domain, however, has been shrinking as in recent years
governments that previously applied the no-strike model to their public service
(e.g., Ontario and Alberta) have shifted it into the controlled-strike model.
It is a very different story when we turn to the question of the model’s
impact on collective bargaining efficacy. As discussed earlier, binding compul-
sory interest arbitration is the normal alternative to strikes. Canadian research
confirms that the substitution of interest arbitration for strikes results in a
significant decrease in the likelihood of bargained settlements. This finding is
consistent with the narcotic effect of arbitration discussed in the literature.102
On the other hand, many workers subject to the no-strike model do not
seem to object to it, arguably because the model provides them with a wage
premium.103 For example, police, fire-fighters, prions guards, and nurses in
Ontario have neither lobbied the government to shift them to the unfettered or
designated strike model nor launched Charter challenges alleging that the
arrangement violates their right to strike. By contrast, nurses in Alberta, who
have a longer tradition of militancy, defied the no-strike model and challenged
its constitutionality when applied to them.104
This leads to the question of whether the no-strike model violates the
constitutional right to strike or is in violation of ILO principles of freedom of
association. As we have seen, this will depend on the ambit of the model and
whether a suitable substitute, like binding interest arbitration by a neutral third
party, is provided. Because the SCC has only recently recognized the constitu-
tional right to strike, and because many workers subject to the no strike model
do not object, there are no judicial decisions in this area. The key question will
be whether the no-strike model is minimally impairing and presumably that will
depend on the court’s view of whether the government has shown that neither
the controlled nor the right to strike models could achieve the same pressing and
substantial objective and that the alternative is fair. With regard to ILO prin-
ciples, the CFA has criticized Canada for imposing the model on groups of
workers who are neither civil servants nor essential service workers.105
8.3 The Controlled Strike Model
The controlled strike model has also proven itself to be effective at maintaining
essential services during a strike. Indeed, Adell et al. found that ‘maintenance of
essential services is most likely to be assured by what we would call a true
designation system – one where the parties themselves play a real part in
working out essential service levels and where disagreements in that respect are
102. Campolieti/Hebdon/Dachis, 2016, 202 et seqq.
103. See supra Section 6.
104. Kauffman, 2017.
105. See supra Sections 5.1 et seqq.
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resolved by an independent adjudicative tribunal.’106 However, actual designa-
tion models in Canada do not always fully fit this description and tend to
decrease the role of unions in negotiating designations and unilaterally increase
the level of service that must be provided and the number of positions that must
be filled. There can be little doubt that these deviations insure that essential
services (and more) are provided.107 Moreover, at least in the federal jurisdic-
tion, the process of negotiating essential service agreements (under the pre-2013
model, which is now being restored) has been a lengthy and time consuming
one. This limits the freedom to strike, since a pre-requisite to a lawful strike is the
existence of an essential service agreement.
But, like the no-strike model, its underside is that it undermines unions’
ability to engage in effective collective bargaining. As we saw, the loss of
bargaining leverage that unions suffer, particularly as designations become
more expansive, results in lower wage increases relative to the other models.
Giving workers the option to choose the no-strike model partly offsets this effect
because of the wage premium from interest arbitration, but then the narcotic
effect kicks in to reduce the likelihood of a negotiated resolution.
The controlled strike model may or may not pass constitutional muster or
comply with ILO standards, depending on how it is constructed. As we saw, in
the SFL case, a draconian version of the model that gives the employer the
unilateral right to designate without adequate independent supervision, and that
does not provide workers with a strike alternative where the level of designation
renders strikes ineffective clearly crosses the line. More recently a Quebec labour
tribunal applied the SFL decision to a provision in the Quebec Labour Code that
required a set minimum percentage of employees to remain on the job during a
strike in health and social service institutions. The tribunal found that the system
of mandatory minima without a right of review by an independent tribunal went
beyond what was necessary to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of essential
services during a strike. The infringement of the right to strike was not minimally
impairing and the tribunal found the provision was unconstitutional.108 It is
unlikely, however, that a scheme that more closely fit the ideal of the ‘true
designation system’ would meet a similar fate.
8.4 Final Observations
From a purely functionalist perspective, it is arguable that Canada’s pluralist
approach to regulating essential service strikes achieves a reasonable balance
between the goal of maintaining required essential services while providing
workers with minimally impairing alternatives. Workers providing essential
106. Adell, 2015, 195.
107. Campolieti/Hebdon/Dachis, 2016, 210.
108. Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs du CIUSSS du Centre-Ouest-de-l’Île-de-Montréal –
CSN et Centre intégré universitaire de santé et des services sociaux du Centre-Ouest-de-
l’Île-de-Montréal, 2017 QCAT 4004.
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services in the strict sense are deprived of the right to strike, but are provided
with binding interest arbitration by a neutral third party. Workers who provide
services not all of which are essential in the strict sense are required to negotiate
essential service agreements before striking, with disputes to be resolved by
neutral labour boards and may opt for arbitration if the level of designation
renders strikes ineffective. And finally, there are workers who provide services
that are not immediately essential but whose extended interruption may cause
serious harm to the public, enjoy a right to strike that may be ended by ad hoc
BTW measures with the dispute to be resolved by interest arbitration.
However, there is a discrepancy between Canadian pluralism in theory and
practice. In particular, the recent turn to neo-liberal austerity has frequently
prompted governments to manipulate the models to reduce unionized public
sector workers’ bargaining power. The behaviour of the Conservative federal
government in 2011 and 2012 is the clearest example of this tendency, but
certainly not the only one. While in the past, unions lacking political clout and
grassroots militancy took their cases to the ILO where they often won moral
victories, since 2015 they can challenge the constitutionality of these laws and
Canadian courts have shown somewillingness to rein in government to preserve
the ‘Canadian’ pluralist model. It remains to be seen how governments will
respond and whether judicial oversight will be strict and sustained.
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